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LONG; ELIZABETH MARON; R. ROBERT CURRIE,  
JR.; KATHIE A. KARSNITZ, in their official capacities;  
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sonia Taylor-Bray appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment to the Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families 
(“DSCYF”).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Taylor-Bray’s appeal concerns only her Title VII employment discrimination 
claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., against DSCYF.1  Taylor-Bray was employed by the 
DSCYF as a youth rehabilitation counselor at the Stevenson House in Milford, Delaware, 
a secure facility for incarcerated youth and pretrial juvenile detainees.  Her job duties 
included assisting in the handling of serious disturbances or subduing unruly residents, 
which could involve physically restraining youth and responding to physical 
confrontations.  Taylor-Bray sustained a workplace injury on June 9, 2008.2  When she 
returned to work following the injury, she was placed on light-duty pursuant to her 
physician’s request, and therefore assigned to a night-shift control room post at the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Taylor-Bray’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 against numerous other 
defendants were dismissed by the District Court early in the litigation.  She does not 
challenge these dismissals on appeal. 
 
2 The summary judgment record shows that Taylor-Bray suffered a small herniated disc 
in her lower back. 
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Stevenson House by her supervisor Donald Mcilvain and/or Superintendent John 
Stevenson. 
 On December 9, 2008, Taylor-Bray’s physician placed her on permanent medium-
duty restrictions.  She requested an accommodation pursuant to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act on the basis that she could no longer restrain the residents, and she filed 
numerous grievances, raising issues of violations of overtime policy, bumping rights for 
shift work, and restrictive duties with respect to seniority.  A human resources specialist 
informed Taylor-Bray on February 25, 2009 that she could not keep her light-duty 
assignment indefinitely; agency policy limited light-duty assignments to thirty days.  
Taylor-Bray was instructed to apply for short term disability insurance benefits.  She did 
not do so initially and instead sought workers’ compensation benefits.  She subsequently 
applied for and received short-term disability benefits.  She was instructed to transition to 
the long term disability benefits program, but failed to do so.   
 Meanwhile, as of May 5, 2009, Taylor-Bray’s physician continued her on 
permanent, medium-duty restrictions.  There were, however, no medium-duty positions 
available as a youth rehabilitative counselor and, in June 2009, a recommendation was 
made to terminate Taylor-Bray’s employment due to her inability to perform the essential 
functions of her job.  On July 20, 2009, Taylor-Bray’s physician provided a return to 
work slip that indicated that she was able to perform all essential aspects of a job with 
permanent medium-duty restrictions.  Because her physician did not release her to full 
duty, she was advised that her employment would be terminated.  Taylor-Bray was 
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terminated from her position by the Secretary of DSCYF due to her inability to perform 
the essential functions of her position, effective July 22, 2009. 
 After she was terminated, Taylor-Bray filed grievances through the collective 
bargaining agreement, claiming discrimination due to her disability.  A hearing was held 
on September 23, 2009, and, on October 2, 2009, the hearing officer denied the 
grievance, finding that Taylor-Bray’s termination was for just cause.  She filed 
grievances with the Delaware Merit Employee Relations Board, which were dismissed 
because the issues were controlled by the collective bargaining agreement.  She also 
unsuccessfully pursued unfair labor practices charges before the Public Employment 
Relations Board. 
 Taylor-Bray also filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation, in connection 
with her termination from employment.3  A notice of her right to sue was mailed to her 
on December 20, 2011, and this civil action, filed in forma pauperis in the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware, followed.  The parties engaged in discovery 
and Taylor-Bray was deposed, testifying about similarly situated males who received 
preferential treatment, and that having to physically restrain the residents 
disproportionately affected women employees.  After the close of discovery, DSCYF 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Taylor-Bray failed to identify valid male 
comparators, and failed to show that the proffered reason for her termination was a 
                                              
3 Taylor-Bray filed a separate charge of discrimination with the EEOC asserting disability 
discrimination, and that issue is the subject of a separate civil action. 
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pretext for discrimination on the basis of gender or retaliation.  Taylor-Bray also moved 
for summary judgment.  In an order entered on March 17, 2015, the District Court 
awarded summary judgment to DSCYF.  Judgment was entered on March 20, 2015. 
    Taylor-Bray appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In her pro 
se brief she argues that the District Court’s emphasis on the “same-supervisor” element in 
its analysis of her comparators was incorrect; that she properly identified similarly 
situated male employees who were treated more favorably; that the reason for her 
termination was a pretext for discrimination, and that retaliation could be inferred 
because her grievances were left unanswered or unresolved. 
 We will affirm.  We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo.   Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary 
judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for 
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).  The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, id. at 587, 
but the nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of her pleading, Fed. 
R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2).  See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 
(1986). 
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 To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, Taylor-Bray was required to 
show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) 
despite her qualifications, she was terminated; and (4) the termination was under 
circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  The primary focus is ultimately on whether the 
employer treated some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, gender, or national origin.  See Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 
789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 DSCYF argued in its summary judgment motion that no similarly-situated man 
was treated better than Taylor-Bray.  Taylor-Bray countered that seven individuals were 
treated more favorably than she.  In the context of personnel actions, the plaintiff is not 
required to show that she is identical to the comparator, but she must show substantial 
similarity.  Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000).  Relevant 
factors include, but are not limited to, whether the comparators “1) had the same job 
description, 2) were subject to the same standards, 3) were subject to the same supervisor, 
and 4) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications.”  Salas v. 
Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 493 F.3d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 2007).  The District Court 
addressed all seven comparators identified by Taylor-Bray and provided cogent reasons 
for rejecting them, including that some had different supervisors, some were able to 
perform the essential functions of the job once removed from restrictive duty, some had 
different medical issues, some held different positions and worked at different facilities, 
one was on administrative leave, and one was actually terminated just as Taylor-Bray was 
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terminated.  Taylor-Bray has not persuaded us that the District Court erred in its 
analysis.4  The individual comparator’s supervisor was but one of many factors 
considered by the District Court and not a particularly decisive one.  We agree with the 
District Court that no reasonable juror could find that any of Taylor-Bray’s proposed 
comparators were actually similarly situated to her. 
 Taylor-Bray contended that the job requirement of physically restraining youths 
has a discriminatory impact on women.  To make out a prima facie case of disparate 
impact gender discrimination, Taylor-Bray must show that the job requirements of her 
position are discriminatory in effect.  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).  
The District Court determined that the challenged requirement – possessing the physical 
ability to restrain youth – was job-related, that the position is held equally among men 
and women, and that light-duty positions are provided to both men and women equally 
when needed.  The summary judgment record fully supports the District Court’s 
determination. 
 Even if Taylor-Bray could make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination, 
she produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that DSCYF’s reason 
for its employment decision was a pretext for discrimination.  If a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to proffer 
some “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for its actions.  See Woodson v. Scott 
                                              
4 Taylor-Bray has discussed a new comparator in her brief on appeal, Nathaniel Bolden.  
Inasmuch as she did not present this comparator to the District Court and has not shown 
that there were extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider this comparator.  See 
Bailey v. United Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 194, 203-204 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997).  To demonstrate pretext under the 
summary judgment standard, a plaintiff must offer evidence that “casts sufficient doubt 
upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could 
reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994).  DSCYF’s proffered reason for terminating Taylor-Bray was 
supported by her own medical records in that her physician never cleared her to return to 
full duty.  Here, no reasonable juror could find that DSCYF’s reason for terminating 
Taylor-Bray was a pretext for gender discrimination.  The summary judgment record 
establishes that Taylor-Bray was terminated because she was unable to perform the 
essential functions of her position, her physician having determined that she was 
permanently restricted to medium-duty work.  Moreover, before being terminated, she 
was allowed to remain in light-duty status for almost three months.  DSCYF’s proffered 
reason for its action was neither “weak, incoherent, implausible, or so inconsistent” that a 
reasonable juror could find it unworthy of credence.  See Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 800. 
 Last, we find no error in the District Court’s determination of Taylor-Bray’s 
retaliation claim.  Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who 
complain about discriminatory treatment.  See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006).  A prima facie claim of retaliation requires a 
showing of “(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either 
after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal 
connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse 
action.”  Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997).  The 
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District Court determined that the fact of the temporal proximity of Taylor-Bray’s 
internal grievances, in relation to DSCYF’s decision that she could not remain 
indefinitely on light duty, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, but 
that DSCYF had, nevertheless, proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its 
decision to terminate her.  On appeal, Taylor-Bray raises two arguments.  First, she 
argues that the District Court erred because it ignored the fact that some of her grievances 
were left unresolved, but whether or not her grievances were resolved is a matter that 
relates solely to her collective bargaining agreement.  This argument has no bearing on 
her Title VII retaliation claim.  She also argues that it was suspect that she initially was 
encouraged to apply for short term disability benefits and was not recommended for 
termination, and then later was terminated, but this issue relates to whether or not she 
made out a prima facie claim for retaliation, an issue decided in her favor by the District 
Court.  The District Court ultimately rejected her retaliation claim because DSCYF 
proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination and not because she 
failed to make out a prima facie case.  Here, no reasonable juror could conclude that there 
was any causal connection between Taylor-Bray’s protected activity and DSCYF’s 
decision to terminate her.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court awarding 
summary judgment to DSCYF. 
 
